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FREEDOM, RESPONSIBILITY,
AND THE LAW*
JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, S.J.

WE

ARE CONFRONTING TODAY in American life two phenomena
which, in their combination, appear paradoxical.

First, there is today a remarkable upsurge of religion. The phenomenon
is complex; it is also ambiguous, both in its content and in its origins. I
shall not undertake to analyze it here. But I would point out one interesting fact. Today we Americans are affirming, perhaps more emphatically than ever before in our history, that we are a religious people; that
we, as a people, believe in God, the Creator and Lord of all things.
However, we seem to be making something more than this purely
religious affirmation. We seem also to be affirming that the existence of
God is the first premise of our organized national life; that the sovereignty of God is the first principle of American politics. We are therefore
not only affirming that God is, and that He is the Lord; we are also
affirming that this nation is under God and under His Lordship.
Now comes the paradox. At the moment when we are witnessing this
upsurge of public religion in America we are notified that there has
occurred a decadence of the public philosophy of America. At the
moment when we are most firmly proclaiming the sovereignty of God
over our nation, we are told that we have lost hold of the body of
mediating principles in terms of which the sovereignty of God becomes
operative as, the dynamic basis of the freedom and the order of our
constitutional commonwealth.
A resolution of the paradox would call for two converging efforts.
First, there is the effort, to be exerted by both clergy and laity, to impart
a properly intellectual dimension to the present religious reawakening;
to give it theological and philosophical substance, lest it waste itself in
the superficial vagaries of a sheer "mood," The second effort falls more
strictly within the responsibilities of the men of the bar and bench. The
corporate body of lawmen bears a special responsibility for the effective
*An address delivered at Fordham University on October 15, 1955 in the Golden
Jubilee Law Lecture Series, sponsored by the Fordham School of Law.
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guardianship and for the periodic renewal
of the public philosophy of the United
States. This is my theme.
It was the providential good fortune of
our American Republic that its constitutional structure was defined and its institutions established within the context of
the liberal tradition of politics; that great
confluence of Greek, Roman, Germanic,
and Christian ideas about society, law, and
government. This tradition reached our
shores substantially intact. It -had indeed
already been secularized somewhat, but it
had not yet been demoralized (the distinction is used by Lord Percy in his book, The
Heresy of Democracy).1 Protestantism had
touched it and left upon it the taint of an
excessive individualism and voluntarism.
The Enlightenment too had laid its secularizing hand upon it; but the influence of
Protestant faith in God and in the Lord
Jesus had at least blunted the impact of
the Enlightenment and preserved the tradition from the radical secularization that
it underwent in Continental Europe. The
political and legal climate of America during the Revolutionary, Constitutional, and
Federalist periods was still substantially a
Christian climate-the same climate within
which the common law and the British
heritage of constitutionalism and the concept of natural rights had been formed.
There was, therefore, in those days, a
public philosophy-that is, a whole body
of concepts, principles, and precepts bearing upon the political life of man; together
with a certain general style of thinking
about all the problems of politics and law.
This public philosophy derived from the
ancient tradition whose central assertion
1 PERCY, THE HERESY OF DEMOCRACY

(1954).

was the existence of a rational order of
truth and justice, which man does not create, since it is the
reflection of the
Eternal Reason of
God, but which
man can discover,
since he is himself
made in the image
of God. It was to
this traditional assertion that the
Declaration of InREV. J. C. MURRAY, S.J. dependence referred when it said: "We hold these truths
to be self-evident. .. " In those 18th gentury days men were perhaps too free in their
use of the word "self-evident." But the substance of the affirmation holds good. We
were then saying: "There are truths, and we
know them." We were saying: "There is a
public philosophy, and we hold it, and upon
this philosophy, as a foundation, we shall
build our independent Republic."
From this philosophy we drew the moral
concept of freedom under law, both divine
and human, and the concept of justice, and
the concept of human equality. From it
too, we derived the political ideas of representation and consent. This philosophy
fashioned for us the conception of the legal
order of society as subject to a higher law
whence it derives its binding force upon
the conscience. This philosophy therefore
taught us that human law is neither simple
fact nor sheer force, but a special form of
moral direction brought to bear, coercively,
upon the action of society in the interests
of freedom and order. In this philosophy
the state is a part of the moral universe,
subject-as the individual man is-to the
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objective canons of justice. Therefore the
state is not omnipotent; it is limited in its
power and action by rights that are inherent in the human person, and it is dedicated by its very nature to the service of
the human person and to the furtherance
of his innate destinies, both temporal and
eternal.
These were in sum the truths we knew
and held, as a people, during the fateful
period when our constitutional commonwealth was founded. This philosophy was
public and official. There was indeed a
measure of dissent from it, but the dissent
was marginal, whereas the consensus was
massive. There was an American orthodoxy. It furnished the premise of our newly
fashioned institutions; and it permeated
them as their inner principle of life. It
established the essential link of continuity
between the new American experiment and
the old Western tradition. At the same
time it stood warrant for the innovations
in the experiment, because it certified them
as developments of the tradition and not
its overthrow. This public philosophy, by
making our concept of free government
intelligible, also made it workable.

defined as "the right to do what one ought,"
a right therefore, that is rooted in reason
and sanctioned by inviolable divine law.
What was no less important, freedom
was also conceived in terms of social relations. It was a responsibility no less than
a right-a right to claim what is due to
oneself, and a responsibility to respect what
is due to others. This responsibility is accepted when freedom in society is claimed.
And both the claim to freedom and the
acceptance of its responsibility entail the
same thing-submission to the rule of law.
"Legum idcirco servi sumus, ut liberi esse
possimus." 2 Freedom can exist only under
the rule of law. And it is the rule of law
which itself guarantees freedom; for it
means that I need obey none but the law.
"Imperia legum potentiora quam hominum," said Livy. And ever afterward men
of the liberal tradition have demanded a
government of laws and not of men. We
Americans call it "free government." It is
the kind of government which establishes a
limited order of rational law that is by the
same token an order of full human freedom.

Only partially was this philosophy committed to paper, in the form of law. More
important was the fact that it formed part
of the general wisdom of the time. The
essence of this general wisdom was perhaps
distilled in the idea that more than any other
idea launched our constitutional commonwealth-the idea of freedom. The idea in
those days had an inner moral structure.
Freedom was not conceived in terms of the
sheer subjective autonomy of the will.
Man's freedom, like man himself, stood
within the moral universe. It meant the
objective right to act; it meant what Acton

The question now is, whether this public
philosophy has survived the impact of
those two potentially destructive agencies
-time, and the mutability of all human
ideas and aspirations. There are those who
say that it has not. A strong case can be
made for this judgment, as expressed, for
example, by Mr. Walter Lippmann:

II

In our time the institutions built upon the
foundations of the public philosophy still
stand. But they are used by a public who are
not being taught, and no longer adhere to,
the philosophy. Increasingly, the people are
2 CICERO, PRO CLUENT. 146.
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alienated from the inner principles of their
3
institutions.
Much evidence, I say, could be adduced
in support of this view. There is, for instance, the widespread popular opinion
that "democracy" consists in one thing
alone-majority rule. And there is the
sophisticated defense of this position, which
consists in an appeal to a philosophical
theory of the relativism of truth and moral
values. This relativism, we are told, is the
official philosophy of democracy; it is today the public philosophy. Perhaps it is,
in point of fact. But if it is, the judgment
of Mr. Lippmann and others is altogether
right. There has taken place an alienation
of the. people from the inner principles of
their institutions; for these inner principles,
in the minds of the men who conceived
the institutions, were certainly not the philosophical dogma that asserts all truths and
values to be relative, or the political dogma
that reduces the substance of democratic
society to a single procedural technique,
majoritarianism.
I should say here that I by no means
deprecate the value of procedures. The
legal rule of due process is, for instance,
largely a matter of procedure; but the observance of this procedure is of the substance of justice. A democratic society
necessarily places a high value on its methods of making decisions and reaching social judgments, whether these be expressed
in law or in more.informal ways. And I
would so far agree with Mr. Erwin Griswold when he says:
A failure to appreciate the intimate relation between sound procedure and the pres-

For methods and procedures are of the
essence of due, process, and are of vital im4
portance to liberty.
This needed to be said. But it still remains
true that to reduce the entire substance of
democracy to a matter of the method of
doing things, independently of any judgment on the rightness or value of what is
done, is to abandon the public philosophy
and the political tradition which launched
our Republic.
I have neither the time nor the wish to
draw up an indictment of certain contemporary theories of democracy; there is a
more important task. I shall simply submit
my own opinion, in two propositions. First,
there has taken place a serious erosion of
the public philosophy of America under
the impact of intellectual forces which have
been able to create a vacuum without at
the same time having the resources with
which to fill it. Second, this dangerous
vacuum at the heart of American life has
come vividly to the awareness of serious
observers; and they are asking the questions: How shall this vacuum be filled?
How shall the public philosophy of America be vigorously renewed? In Mr. Lippmann's words: "The poignant question is
whether, and, if so, how, modern men
could make vital contact with the lost traditions of civility."5 I believe that this
question is put with particular sharpness
to the legal profession.
III

ervation of liberty is implicit ... in that sad-

However, before embarking on this
topic one thing ought to be made clear. The
renewal of our American public philosophy
does not mean a return to the past. The

dest and most short-sighted remark of our
times: "I don't like the methods, but .... "

4 GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY 38

3 LIPPMANN, TnE PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 102 (1955).

(1955).
5 See note 3 supra.
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movement cannot be launched under the
slogan, "Back to the Founding Fathers!"
Even if we were to execute this maneuver
of a return to the past, we would find that
the philosophy of the Founding Fathers,
good as it was, is not good enough for the
political and social needs of today, any
more than their Deism would be good
enough for our contemporary religious
needs.
I have said that the Founding Fathers
did their work within the context of an
older tradition, the liberal tradition of the
West. This was the basic strength of their
thought-that it was traditional. But this
too was its weakness; for they made contact with, the older tradition at a moment
when it had already been weakened from
within and had begun its decline. We can
see this today, both from the standpoint of
our scholarship and also from the standpoint of our experience-political, social,
and economic. Hence we can see what our
problem is today. It is not to go back to
the Founding Fathers; you would better
say that it is to go forward from the
Founding Fathers. Our problem is not to
make vital contact with the traditions of
civility as these traditions were possessed
and restated by the great men of the 18th
century. Our problem is to go back beyond
the 18th century and to make vital contact
with the traditions of civility in their purer
form before they had been touched by the
rationalism, voluntarism, secularism and
individualism of 18th century England and
America. It is only thus that tiaditions are
renewed-first, by a return to their original
sources, and then by a restatement of their
original principles and inspirations in terms
of a later and much altered social reality.
This is a large subject. I shall pause only

long enough to make it somewhat concrete by an example.
There was no doubt that early America
was profoundly influenced by the theories
of John Locke. However, to the American
of 1955, who understands our society as it
is, John Locke looks quite different than
he did to the men of '79. Locke's thedries
of liberty and of civil government and of
their relations were convincing in the 18th
century-because it was the 18th century.
But it is no good trying to resurrect Locke
today; he is dead and buried.
Indeed there are those who are now saying that his grave is that of a villain, not
of a hero. It can be argued-as it has been
argued by Patrick Gordon-Walker in his
book, Restatement of Liberty-that it was
precisely John Locke who involved society
in the dilemma from which it is today
struggling to escape. 6 The horns of the
dilemma are an individualism that verges
toward anarchy, and a collectivism that
verges toward tyranny. From this dilemma,
they say, there is no escape in terms of
the Locke theories and their assumptions.
They conclude that we need today a political, social, and economic philosophy as
different from Locke's as the America of
1955 is different from the England of 1688.
Locke may have been good enough for the
Founding Fathers; he is not good enough
for us.
Nor are the Founding Fathers themselves good enough, though we can still
learn much from them. Our task is not
the recapture of a particular moment in
the history of the liberal tradition; it is the
re-creation of the tradition itself through
6 GORDON-WALKER,

16-21, 33 (1951).
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an understanding of its inner substance
and through an adaptation of this substance to the society in which we live. This
much, I think, needed to be said in order
to measure the magnitude of the task that
confronts us.
IV
To the doing of this task the corporate
body of lawmen is held, I think, by most
cogent reasons.
History itself has imposed this responsibility. It has often been pointed out that
the political and constitutional tradition of
America, in which so much of the public
philosophy is enshrined, was fashioned in
its origins largely by lawyers. The Constitutional period from 1785 onwards and thereafter, up to the 1830s-is now
looked upon as a sort of Golden Age. In
those days the lawyer stood closest to the
great public issues of the time. He instinctively took these issues at their highest
level; and he brought to bear upon them
not only an acuteness of practical legal
judgment but also the rich resources of
philosophy, history, jurisprudence, and the
law of nations. There were statesmen of
the law in those days, when lawyers were
likewise men of state-men of whom it
could not be said, as Disraeli said of Lord
Brougham, "The lawyer has spoiled the
statesman." On the contrary, those men set
their knowledge of the law in the service
of statesmanship. And they established a
tradition. The study of the law became, as
Jefferson noted, "the most certain stepping
stone in a political line." This "political
line" led, as he further noted in context,
to public usefulness rather than merely to
the honors and prerequisites of public office
(which were few, then as now). The dynamism of the profession seems to have

been a sense of responsibility to the public,
not only in regard of its framework of law
but also in regard of the quality of its ideas,
the content of its philosophy, and the
whole ethos of the state.
One should not, of course, romanticize
that Golden Age. There were men of base
metal in it-ignorant and cynical men who
merited the satire of Benjamin Franklin.
But it can nonetheless be said that there
was a general realization among the lawmen that their calling brought them close
to the fountainhead of freedom and order
in society; that the instrument with which
they worked influenced the direction of
society, for good or ill; that they were importantly the architects of free government. To use Mr. Justice Stone's later but
altogether traditional phrase, the bar in
that generation understood that it was "the
guardian of public interests committed to
its care," and that the law itself was the
first of these public interests.
It is not therefore surprising that the
men of the bar, as de Tocqueville observed, -formed an accepted aristocracy
within American society. He said:
The profession of the law is the only
aristocratic element which can be amalgamated without violence with the natural
elements of democracy .... I cannot believe
that a republic could subsist at the present
time if the influence of lawyers in public
business did not increase in proportion to
7
the power of the people.
De Tocqueville seems here to be pointing to perhaps the deepest source of the
bar's responsibility for the public philosophy-I mean the fact that the bar occupies a mediatorial position between
government and the people.
What de Tocqueville feared, of course,
7 TOCQUEVILLE,
(1947).

DEMOCRACY IN

AMERICA
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were the dangers inherent in popular government. There is the danger of tyranny
on the part of the majority. There is also
the danger that in a democracy the whole
process of government may be denatured
in a' particular way. It is in the nature of
government, as it is in the nature of law,
that it should exert the pressure of reason
upon the affairs of men in society. Government, and law too, are rational, or they
are not government and law at all. But
de Tocqueville feared that the essential
rationality of the governmental and legal
process would be perverted in consequence
of popular pressures. Behind these pressures would lie, not reason and justice and
concern for the common good, but unruly
passion and narrow partisanship and exclusive concern for private or group interest. Therefore he looked for salvation
to the aristocracy of the bar-to the men
who understand the nature of law, and to
that extent, the nature also of government.
V
I think that I am in the line of his argument when I say that the bar is the
guardian of the public interest in free and
rational government, in consequence of the
ideal of the lawyer as the "officer of the
court," in something more than a merely
technical sense of the phrase. This ideal
itself derives from the high tradition of the
public philosophy. . To understand the
public philosophy is, I think, to understand that a lawyer is neither an employee
nor a mere agent of his client. Neither
is he in the status of an independent contractor. He is a fiduciary; or, more accurately, he stands at one end of a particular type of confidential relationship.
The lawyer-client relationship is quite different from most of the relationships which
arise when one man pays another man
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money to accomplish for him a certain
task. Within the traditions of the bar,
which are part of the high traditions of
civilty, the peculiarities of the lawyerclient relationship are not the consequence
of any private contract between client and
lawyer. They are the consequence of the
status of the bar itself within society-the
consequence of the particular functions
which society has committed to the legal
profession.
Fidelity to his client is indeed the lawyer's duty; therefore vigorous advocacy is
his right. But this fidelity is not his full
duty; nor is its consequent right of advocacy unlimited-whatever men may have
thought in the nineteenth century, when a
pervasive individualism resulted in a stress
on the lawyer-client contract to the detriment of the lawyer-client relationship. This
relationship involves an element of social
responsibility. Jeremiah S. Black showed
his sense of this responsibility when in
1883 he refused a retainer to argue the
railroad case against public regulation of
railroads. He was, he said, pledged to the
people on the issues at stake.
In America the lawyer's right of advocacy is recognized in fullest measure.
The lawyer may justifiably seek to give his
client the fullest advantage of existing laws
-when dealing, for instance, with revenue
or antitrust laws. But he has further responsibilities, owed to society. There is, for
instance, his responsibility for -the law itself
and for its due observance, which requires
him to instruct his client in the meaning
and purposes of the law, and to tell him
what it forbids as well as what it permits.
The public philosophy had no hold on.the
man (whoever he was; the statement has
been attributed to several) who said that a
good lawyer was one who would tell his
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client, not what he could not do, but how
to do what he wanted to do. This piece
of cynicism clashes with tradition. "Nullius
potentia supraleges." No one's power and
no one's private interests stand above the
law.
The true tradition appears in the story
told in testimony when Louis D. Brandeis
was up for confirmation as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court. Brandeis was
once asked to represent the interests of a
great investment banking group in a proxy
fight involving the Illinois Central. He had
a conflict of interests problem. But what
was even more important to him was this:
he required, said the banker testifying, "to
be satisfied of the justness of our position."
This requirement is in the high tradition
of the public philosophy. Not all of
Brandeis' contemporaries felt its urgency.
A prominent lawyer, who was opposed to
Brandeis, wrote to a friend: "The trouble
with Mr. Brandeis is that he never loses
his judicial attitude toward his clients. He
always acts the part of a judge toward his
clients, instead of being his clients' lawyer,
which is against the practices of the Bar."
This statement bears ironic witness to the
extent to which the public philosophy had
at the time ceased to guide the practices
of the bar. When partisanship comes to
be considered as the sum of the professional obligation; when the judicial attitude-the habit of detached, disinterested,
impartial appraisal of the merits-is deprecated, surely a decadence of the public
philosophy has set in. The overriding professional obligation, which is higher than
the contract of service, has been forgotten.
VI
There is another, perhaps more imme-

diate meaning of the phrase, "officer of the
court," as it has been understood within
the tradition. The phrase specifies the lawyer's oldest task and his most traditional
function in the execution of the laws, that
is, his duty to assist the court to a proper
decision of litigated matter. From our
standpoint here this function demands
more than diligence in research and candor
in the presentation of evidence. It also demands more than an effort at correct interpretation of the law and at a just
application of it to the facts of the case.
There is the further effort incumbent on
the lawyer to bring his theory of the case
within the tradition of American law, as
this tradition is itself sustained by the broad
tenets of the public philosophy.
The tremendous importance of this effort is seen today in certain types of cases
that are coming to the fore-cases involving freedom of speech, freedom of religion, separation of church and state, the
privilege against self-incrimination, and the
whole range of problems involved in the
concept of internal security. Such cases
present a great challenge to technical skill.
But they also present a challenge to the
legal mind on a deeper level. They challenge the lawyer's philosophical grasp of
the American tradition and its sustaining
philosophy. They also challenge his philosophical understanding of the on-going
world of affairs and its requirement that
the tradition be adapted to the felt needs
of the time.
It has been remarked how much the
judge relies upon the lawyer for the concepts which will make intelligible to him
the great churning world of affairs and
ideas which parades through his courtroom.
It has also been remarked that judicial
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opinions are constantly incurring a great
debt to the work of legal scholars and of
counsellors. The indebtedness may not
always be acknowledged; but it is there to
be seen. Time and again the doctrinal
bridges to judicial decisions have been
erected by lawyers. This too is part of the
lawyer's high function as officer of the
court. The importance of its responsible
discharge is strikingly seen, I think, in cases
in which the issues go deep into the roots
of our constitutional tradition of freedom
and order, particularly in our own day
when the substance of this tradition is
menaced by forces at work both within our
society and without it.

VII
If we are to accept the verdict of history, we may have to recognize that the
legal profession failed, at least to some
significant extent, before the moral challenge put to it in the nineteenth century
by the rise of industrial capitalism. In the
construction of the socio-economic edifice
that then took shape the lawyer was called
upon to play an increasingly important and
many-sided role. Looking back now, the
legal profession (some individuals excepted) may not feel that it played its
role with a sufficient sense of moral and
social responsibility. 8 However, we can

In this connection I might briefly make
a concrete point. I do not myself believe
that any solid bridge of legal doctrine has
yet been built to a right decision-both
legislative and judicial - on the vexing
problem of reconciling the legal demands
of separation of church and state with the
rightful social and religious demands of a
people that confesses itself to be religious
and that also knows its socio-religious
structure to be pluralist and tripartite.
There is here a task for the legal profession, to be performed not only, or even
mainly, in the courtroom, but also, and
particularly, in the larger forum of public
opinion.

were men's interests and institutions - it might
appear that for one hundred, years past the bar
had not fulfilled the constructive role open to it;

Perhaps I have said enough to make, at
least in outline, my major point - that
within the scope of his own ideals as a
man of state and an officer of the court
the lawyer incurs a responsibility for the
guardianship and renewal of the public
philosophy and also finds the opportunities
for the discharge of -this responsibility. In
conclusion I shall make two further points.

8 "From the vantage point of 1950 - in a country
newly conscious of how sensitively interrelated

it might appear that lawyers had been too preoccupied with law as a game, or an instrument
for private ends. If an observer were measurably
justified in passing this judgment, he was not
thereby entitled to any moral complacency. Lawyers had shared the going values and vision of
their times. With other people in the United
States, they had joined in economic and social
growth that was daring and constructive, and also
in growth that was ruthless and wasteful. With
others they had - after the creative generation
that produced the Constitution - been indifferent,
hostile, or timid toward adapting their political
institutions to the sweep of change. As a group
or organized guild, lawyers had stood inert or
antagonistic before some imperative needs to
reform law and its administration. Nonetheless,
individual lawyers were counted among the initiators, architects, and administrators of much of
the constructive work in social control after the
'70s. Many of the counts that might be leveled
against the bar must in justice be directed equally
at the society which it reflected. Given the
avowed ideals of the legal profession, the most
just criticism which could be made against it
individually was that it asserted an independence

and a leadership in the public interest which in
practice it had abdicated during most of the years
after 1870." HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN
LAW 374-75 (1950).
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leave the dead to bury the dead. Insofar
as there was failure in the past, there is all
the more reason for resolve in the present.
Now is the time to resolve that there shall
be no failure in the face of the more searching spiritual and intellectual challenge of
our own midtwentieth-century moment.
If it be true, as I think it is, that the
menace of erosion threatens that public
philosophy which is the inspiration of
American freedom and the fountainhead
of American law, then this is no time for
the legal profession to succumb to a complete absorption in the workaday world of
client care-taking or to the naivete which
would forsake the full ideal of the profession in order to pursue singly the minor
goal of technical craftsmanship.
There is today a general challenge to
all ranks and institutions of society, that
they should rise to the height of the times,
lest they be over-taken by a flood more
disastrous than that from which Noah rescued civilization in a primitive wooden
boat. As it reaches the legal profession this
general challenge is an invitation to step
across the threshold into a new age. Certainly the threshold itself is there; and beyond it lies an age that will surely be new.
Whether its newness will be for good or
ill is still undecided. The crucial question
is what will be the tenets of the public
philosophy in terms of which American
society will chart its course?
Will they be the ancient principles of
truth and justice, of freedom and order, of
human rights and responsibilities, that
were inherent in the tradition to which our
Republic is tributary? Or will command
of the new age be taken by some one of
the new-found philosophies which are
presently at war with the high liberal tradi-

tion? Surely I speak for you when I say
that it is only in the old liberal tradition,
newly made relevant to the problems of
the day, that our Republic-and with it,
all the world-can hope to find continually
a new birth of freedom and a constant
regeneration of the law. But if the central
tradition of the West is to be renewed in
a form more profound and vital than that
which animated our Founding Fathers, the
new age must see the legal profession assert in practice that moral independence
and that intellectual leadership in the
public interest which is its historical prerogative and its inherent duty. If this is
strongly done, a new Golden Age will redeem the America which the first Golden
Age created.
My concluding point concerns the manner in which the influence of the lawyer
will be felt in the shaping of the new age
according to the spirit of the old tradition.
In the past, James Willard Hurst remarks:
The main force of lawyers was not felt
through the work of a few men of creative
genius. It did not come from a recognized
professional guild. It came from the cumulative influence of many able men who were
effective because they had a common body
of learning, tradition, and techniques, and
because together they concentrated on and
developed special skills and feel for the
process of adjustment in social relations. 9
So, I expect, it will be in the future. The
contribution of the bar to the renewal of
the traditions of civilty will have to be a
corporate contribution.
Moreover, one special group will be
looked to for a signal share in this corporate contribution. This group has come
lately on the scene-within the last twenty
(Continued on page 276)
9 Id. at 335.

